Abstract: Many have argued that the human sciences feature a unique form of understanding (Verstehen) that is absent from the natural sciences. However, in the last decade or so, epistemologists and philosophers of natural science have been proffering analyses of a kind of natural-scientific understanding. Using examples from educational psychology and anthropology, I argue that there are prima facie reasons to think these recent accounts of natural-scientific understanding impose necessary conditions on Verstehen. This suggests that any claim about Verstehen's distinctiveness faces hitherto-unappreciated burdens of proof.
Introduction
In the philosophy of social science, understanding (Verstehen) involves the grasping of meaningful behavior, psychological states, practices, and cultural artifacts.
Historically, hermeneuticists took Verstehen to distinguish the social from the natural sciences, while positivists demurred. While the arguments have matured over the years, the dialectical space has retained much of its 19 th century topology, with "interpretivists" (Stueber 2006 ) and "naturalists" (Roth 2003) taking over the respective roles of hermeneuticists and positivists.
Traditionally, when philosophers of social science have debated about
Verstehen, only interpretivists lay claim to a concept of understanding. However, current work in epistemology and the philosophy of natural science challenges this framework by offering more general concepts of understanding, intended to encompass both the human and natural sciences. These developments shift the terms of the debate. No longer is the question whether the human sciences alone aim at understanding. Rather, the question is whether and to what extent the human and natural sciences aim at the same kind of understanding.
Using the account of natural-scientific understanding from my book, (Khalifa 2017) , I shall argue that the burden of proof hangs on interpretivists' shoulders, for understanding in the human sciences appears to have much in common with its natural-scientific cousin. I shall present my case as follows. Section 2 motivates infusing the debate between interpretivists and naturalists with the new literature on understanding.
Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
Section 3 presents my account of natural-scientific understanding, and extends it to a case of social-scientific understanding from educational psychology. Section 4 then extends it to an example from cultural anthropology. Given its application to these rather disparate examples, I suggest that we have some preliminary evidence in favor of naturalism. Section 5 then rehearses how interpretivists might reply to this challenge, and shows that they face substantial tasks going forward.
Before proceeding, I offer a caveat. In this paper, I shall only argue that all of the norms governing understanding in the natural sciences also apply to understanding in the human sciences. I will not broach the important question of whether the only norms governing understanding in the human sciences are those of the natural sciences. I hope to address this in future work. Furthermore, the reasons offered for naturalism are not intended to be conclusive. Rather, they are offered more in the spirit of reorienting the dialectical burdens concerning the distinctiveness of understanding in the human sciences.
The Verstehen Wars
Many have debated whether certain social sciences (hereafter, "the human sciences") feature a kind of understanding that is distinct from anything found in the natural sciences. For ease of reference, let's introduce some terminology. First, denote this allegedly distinctive form of understanding with the German "Verstehen." Typically, Verstehen is characterized as some kind of accurate simulation of another's mental states and processes, and human-scientific accounts-most notably intentional-action explanations-improve in proportion to the Verstehen they recruit, enable, or provide. Next, let's denote the kind of understanding common to all of the natural sciences with the phrase "scientific understanding." Furthermore, let "understanding" be the genus that includes both Verstehen and scientific understanding. Finally, for added flourish, let's call the debate as to whether Verstehen is distinct from scientific understanding "the Verstehen Wars." Those who claim that Verstehen is distinctive shall be called "interpretivists;" those who deny this, "naturalists."
Earlier Verstehen Wars assumed that the only kind of understanding was Verstehen. Thus, interpretivists claimed that only the human sciences featured understanding, while naturalists claimed that understanding was no part of any science-human or otherwise. However, this may not be the most profitable way of carving up the landscape. Natural scientists have long claimed that understanding is one of their aims. For instance, Schrödinger (1954, 90) writes:
What are the peculiar, special traits of our scientific world-picture? About one of these fundamental features there can be no doubt. It is the hypothesis that the display of Nature can be understood.
Similarly and more recently, Nobel-winning astronomer Robert Kirshner (1994, 65) writes:
Understanding the history of matter and searching for its most interesting forms, such as galaxies, stars, planets and life, seems a suitable use for our intelligence.
Parallel developments in recent epistemology and philosophy of natural science also suggest that purveyors of Verstehen have no monopoly on the term "understanding."
Here, the main questions are whether understanding is a species of knowledge, whether it traffics exclusively in truth, what kinds of cognitive abilities it requires, and even whether it requires explanation. 1 Similarly, in the philosophy of the natural sciences, accounts of understanding have shed new light on idealization, modeling, realism, explanation, representation, and the aims of scientific inquiry.
Importantly, none of these positions makes any exception when human affairs are the objects of understanding. To be sure, some contributors to this burgeoning literature argue that understanding possesses a distinctive epistemic value that other epistemic standings (such as knowledge) lack (Kvanvig 2003 , Pritchard 2010 . However, even they make no special allowance for the human sciences. In other words, whatever distinctive epistemic value understanding has, it is understanding that applies just as much to the phenomena studied by physics as the phenomena studied by history or anthropology.
Against this backdrop, the older battle lines of the Verstehen Wars should be redrawn. No longer should we be asking, "Does a methodologically sound human science feature Verstehen?" Rather, we should be asking, "What, if anything, distinguishes Verstehen from scientific understanding?" On this new way of carving things up, interpretivists claim that something can fund this distinction; naturalists disagree. As mentioned above, I will offer only a partial and preliminary argument for naturalism, in that I will argue that Verstehen is a species of scientific understanding. This is partial because I will say very little about how Verstehen differs from other kinds of scientific understanding. It is provisional in that my arguments are based on just two examples of understanding in the social sciences, as well as some more general philosophical reflections. Additional examples could certainly falsify these claims.
These qualifications notwithstanding, I hope to shed some new light on the Verstehen Wars. First, if the arguments here are sound, then interpretivists will have a narrower but better-circumscribed problem space than before, for I will have shown that scientific understanding imposes necessary conditions on Verstehen.
Thus, interpretivists will have to show that scientific understanding does not also impose sufficient conditions on Verstehen, or else the game is up. Second, my account of scientific understanding is formulated fairly precisely and lends itself to being evaluated by concrete examples from different sciences. In my estimate, earlier iterations of the Verstehen Wars have been sparse along both of these dimensions. Thus, I hope that my partial and provisional answer in favor of naturalism is nevertheless illuminating.
The EKS Model
I shall now present my account of understanding, which I call the ExplanationKnowledge-Science (EKS) Model. 2 It has been applied, with varying degrees of detail, to numerous examples from physics (quantum mechanics, Galilean dynamics, statistical mechanics), ecology, and biomedical research. I now extend it to the social sciences. In this section, I examine how it fares with an example from educational psychology. In the next section, I look at ethnography.
I begin with a phenomenon that I suspect is familiar to many a reader. In the course of teaching, we frequently encounter students who are struggling with the material, yet, curiously, they seem the most reticent to come to office hours, seek tutoring, etc. What could explain this self-defeating behavior, and how might educators counteract it? In a widely cited study, Ryan, Gheen, and Midgley (1998) studied 516 sixth-graders in 62 math classrooms to examine the effect of classroom's goal structure and social climate on this phenomenon of "help avoidance."
Using five-point scales, students were asked to assess the extent to which different statements were true of them. These scores were used as measures for the following four variables:
• Their proclivity to avoid seeking help.
• Their estimates of their ability to complete work or their "self-efficacy."
• Their perception of whether students in their class are largely rewarded for effort (a "task-based goal structure") or for being better than their peers (an "ability-based goal structure").
• Their perception of whether their teachers were providing social-emotional support in addition to academic support.
After running a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analysis on their data, Ryan et al. found that high self-efficacy and being male significantly increased help avoidance, while students' perceptions of the classroom as having a task-based (rather than ability-based) goal structure and an emotionally supportive teacher significantly decreased help avoidance. From this, they explain students' help avoidance as a confluence of these interacting factors.
Let's assume that Ryan et (1) p is (approximately) true;
(2) q satisfies your favorite (but reasonable) ontological requirements; (3) q makes a difference to p; and (4) q satisfies the relevant local constraints.
Consider, for instance, that a lower sense of self-efficacy explains why some students are reluctant to seek help. The first condition is uncontroversial: if no students were reluctant to seek help, there would be nothing to explain. The second condition is designed to circumvent the scientific realism debate. If you're an antirealist, then presumably you will only require your explanans to be utile, empirically adequate, etc. If you're a realist, you'll demand greater fidelity to the world. In our example, different psychologists might well have differing stances toward the ontological status of students' sense of self-efficacy. Some may think it refers to a robust psychological motivation, others to a useful operational definition, etc. The EKS Model's second condition on explanation is designed to be accommodating on this front.
The third requirement on explanation echoes a widespread idea in the explanation literature, namely that explanations ought to tell us what would happen to the explanandum if the explanans were different (Woodward 2003) .
Given the statistical methods used, there is no doubt that this is in play here, for the claim (at root) is that students' sense of self-efficacy makes a statistically significant difference to their proclivity toward help avoidance. Finally, as a scientific pluralist, I'd like to leave room for a variety of different kinds of explanations. My fourth, local constraint does just this. In this particular case, Ryan et al. focus on some the causes of help avoidance that concern student perceptions.
The EKS Model's second key concept is scientific knowledge. I hold that scientific knowledge of why p is achieved when one's belief in an explanation of p is "safe" because of one's scientific explanatory evaluation (SEEing). A belief is safe if and only if it could not easily have been false given the way it was actually formed (Pritchard 2005) . This entails that it is true, and provides useful way of unpacking how beliefs can be reliably formed. SEEing consists of three stages: (a) considering plausible potential explanations of a phenomenon, (b) comparing those explanations using the best available scientific methods and evidence, and (c) basing one's (typically doxastic) commitments about those explanations on those comparisons.
Thus, the claim is that scientific knowledge of an explanation is achieved when one's explanatory commitments could not easily have been false given the way that one considered and compared that explanation to plausible alternatives of the same phenomenon.
Ryan et al. engage in SEEing. They consider not only the explanatory factors canvassed above (self-efficacy, gender, goal structure, and social-emotional support), but also teacher attitudes about their goal and support structure. They not only consider individual student perceptions, but also aggregate classroom perceptions of self-efficacy, goal structure, and social-emotional support. This latter point is what leads them to adopt HLM rather than standard ordinary least squares analyses, since it is better method for comparing individual-and group-level effects.
Moreover, in their comparisons, they found that some variables-such as teacher attitudes and perceptions-make no difference to help avoidance, and also find interesting interactions between other variables such as self-efficacy and gender. Finally, they draw the appropriate inferences from these different comparisons: some variables are taken to be explanatory, while others are not. To take a head is, in Ilongot terms, not to capture a trophy, but to 'throw away' a body part, which by a principle of sympathetic magic represents the cathartic throwing away of certain burdens of life-the grudge an insult has created, or the grief over death in the family, or the increasing 'weight' of remaining a novice when one's peers have left that status.
Turn now to the four conditions from my thin account of explanation. The first condition requires the explanandum to be approximately true, and it is: many Ilongot men take heads. 6 Next, consider the explanans. All indications are that Rosaldo takes headhunting's status as a rite of passage and a symbolic unburdening to be genuine motivations of why Ilongot men engage in this practice. In other words, this explanans appears to be more or less true, which thereby satisfies a reasonable ontological commitment.
Furthermore, while he does not explicitly speak of difference-making, it would be natural to interpret him as committed to the counterfactual claim that, ceteris paribus, if taking a head were not a rite of passage for Ilongot youths, then, in general, Ilongot men would not take heads. Furthermore, it is clear that he is seeking cultural causes of Ilongot headhunting, which can be regarded as a local constraint. Additionally, he clearly disavows deterministic causation as a local constraint (Rosaldo 1980, 152-153) . Consequently, all of the requirements of my thin account of explanation are satisfied. It is also natural to interpret his writing as assertoric. Hence, he appears to believe this explanation. Thus, according to the EKS Model, Rosaldo has minimal understanding of why Ilongot men take heads.
Turn now to the THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE, which states that understanding improves in proportion to the amount of explanatory information grasped. Not only does Rosaldo identify the cultural factors that contribute to Ilongot headhunting, but he also examines historical-political factors of headhunting, such as feuds between different Ilongot groups (betran) (Rosaldo 1980, 61-79) and psychological factors that drove individual Ilongot men, such as the ever-volatile Luku, to take heads at particular times (Rosaldo 1980, 164-165) . These explanations also satisfy the requirements of my thin account of explanation, but, more importantly, having all three kinds of explanation-cultural, historical-political, and psychologicalimproves our understanding of Ilongot headhunting, as the THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE states. Thus, we see yet another way in which the EKS Model readily accounts for Rosaldo's understanding of Ilongot headhunting.
The EKS Model's third and final feature is THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE, which holds that understanding improves to the degree that one's grasp of explanatory information resembles scientific knowledge. Recall that scientific knowledge of an explanation, in turn, was defined as a belief that is safe because of scientific explanatory evaluation (SEEing). Rosaldo exhibits all three of SEEing's aforementioned stages. First, he considers several plausible potential explanations of Ilongot headhunting. In addition to the cultural, historical-political, and psychological factors just discussed, Rosaldo also considers other explanations, such as that historically invariant social structures explain Ilongot headhunting (pp. 26-27) ; that the Ilongot testimony he acquired was mendacious (pp. 109-134); and that Ilongot men are obligated to take heads (pp. 141-142).
The second and third stages of SEEing involves comparing the explanations considered and committing oneself to various explanatory claims on the basis of those comparisons. The last three candidate explanations were ultimately rejected on the respective grounds that:
• Ilongot headhunting waxed and waned at different periods from 1883-1974, and hence could not be the result of an invariant social structure.
• Careful investigation of Ilongot testimonial norms across a wide variety of domains reveals them to be strongly error-averse: one rarely testifies to something that one has not witnessed firsthand. Furthermore, claims about headhunting were robust across different testimonial sources.
• The presence of married novices, plus evidence that the idea that Ilongot were obligated to take heads sprung from gossip and Christian propaganda.
Comparisons need not always involve explanatory competition. Often, comparisons reveal interactions or complementarities between explanations. 7 Rosaldo does precisely this with the cultural, historical-political, and psychological explanations that he accepted. For instance, intergenerational feuds between different betran leads to a host of psychological burdens. Members of one betran may harm members of another, such that the latter's sons are both saddened and insulted. Headhunting is a way for the sons to unburden themselves of these emotions.
However, whereas the norm appears to be that the taking of nearly any head has this cathartic effect, the aforementioned Luku, a member of the Rumyad betran, was somewhat unique in passing up the opportunity to take the head of an outsider, and insisting instead on taking the head of a member from the rival Butag betran. (Rosaldo 1980, 14-28) . He also provides a detailed discussion of his method of "cohort analysis" (Rosaldo 1980, 110-120) in which groups of similarlyaged Ilongot were studied longitudinally, in order to transform "the composite biography into a collection of individual biographies in their historical, cultural, and social structural contexts" (Rosaldo 1980, 110) . Cohort analysis was not used widely in ethnography, though it was a standard method in the adjacent fields of demography, sociology, and social history.
Thus, it appears that Rosaldo's inquiry includes many features of THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE. Insofar as anything is absent, it is that he makes no explicit references to anything resembling safety, i.e. that his explanations could not easily have been false. However, as I argue elsewhere (Khalifa 2017, 48-50, 194-207) Verstehen is not a kind of scientific understanding than has been countenanced.
Verstehen without Minimal Understanding?
Recall my account of MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING:
Minimal understanding of why p is having an approximately true belief in an explanation of p.
As I see it, interpretivists can deny this in one of two ways. First, they can deny that Verstehen requires approximate truth. Second, they can deny that Verstehen requires explanation.
Denying that Verstehen traffics in approximate truth seems curious. After all, the goal of Verstehen appears to be an accurate depiction of another person's mental life. Furthermore, the hedge-that the explanation be approximately true-is meant to dispel utopian demands for top-shelf fidelity to every detail of another's inner workings. So, the basic picture is that one must get something about another's perspective more or less right in order to understand. Interpretivists would have to find social-scientific examples that forgo this basic requirement in order to show that Verstehen need not be approximately true. This is no small feat.
Our examples certainly provide no indication that this is the case. Suppose, for instance, that self-efficacy, gender, and student perceptions classroom goal structure and of their teachers' emotional supportiveness did not explain patterns of help avoidance, or that headhunting's status as a rite of passage did not explain its prevalence among Ilongot men. In such cases, one might reasonably worry that our inquirers have misunderstood help avoidance or Ilongot headhunting. Moreover, this does not appear to be peculiar to these sorts of examples.
A more promising way of challenging Verstehen's veridicality would be to embed it in a kind of antirealism. Perhaps competent interpreters need not believe that propositional attitudes and mental representations exist, but they nevertheless use them for predicting and explaining others' actions. However, it is hard to see how this will pass the Distinction Test. After all, some have suggested precisely the same stance be adopted toward theoretical entities in the natural sciences (van Fraassen 1980) . Indeed, as we have seen, my thin account of explanation is amenable to explanation having more relaxed ontological requirements than scientific realists require. 9 If interpretivists cannot overcome these obstacles to denying MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING'S requirement of approximate truth, then perhaps they would be better served to deny that Verstehen requires explanation. This claim, of course, has a much longer history in the Verstehen Wars, for Verstehen was frequently contrasted with Erklären, i.e., explanation. However, such arguments have been repeatedly thwarted on the grounds that they caricature explanations in the natural sciences. For instance, while Erklären-qua-interpretivist-bogeyman has, at various points, required laws and causation, it's highly doubtful that the life sciences traffic in the nomological (Woodward 2001 , Mitchell 1997 and there has been a profusion of philosophical discussions about noncausal explanations throughout the natural sciences (Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018).
The EKS Model is chastened by these and other developments, and thus imposes more modest requirements on explanation than interpretivists have considered. Indeed, its most distinctive requirement-that the explanans make a difference to the explanandum-is one that I have, in subsequent work, questioned as a universal constraint on all explanations (Khalifa, Doble, and Millson forthcoming) . All of this makes interpretivist attempts to pass the Distinction Test unpromising.
Let me consider two more avenues for divorcing Verstehen from explanation. Objectual understanding is generally thought to be achievable without explanation. For instance, simply being able to situate a phenomenon in a broader inferential framework might garner some degree of objectual understanding. 10 Moreover, thinking of Verstehen as a kind of objectual understanding is highly suggestive, for interpreters seem to seek understanding of people and not simply understanding of why those people do and think various things.
However, such a strategy is not without its difficulties. Those who have defended objectual understanding make no special allowance for the human sciences, so interpretivists run the risk of flunking the Distinction Test. Specifically, if this kind of "proto-understanding" were not countenanced, then it becomes increasingly difficult to account for why some descriptions about a subject do not appear to enhance our understanding. For instance, why is Rosaldo's description of Ilongot ways of describing the past illuminating of their headhunting practice while the true statement, "Either Ilongot take heads or unicorns exist," is not? A plausible answer is that only the former can play an explanatory role, and thus puts inquirers on the right track to explanatory understanding. Specifically, because Rosaldo is using Ilongot testimony to determine why different periods of their history had varying levels of headhunting, it is important that he have an accurate way of inferring historical claims from their testimony. In this way, claims about their descriptions of the past play an explanatory role as evidence that can be used for confirming explanations about historical patterns of headhunting.
Thus, we have seen that interpretivists face formidable challenges in denying the EKS Model's account of minimal understanding, which requires approximately true beliefs in explanations. To deny that Verstehen must be approximately true seems to either to contravene an obvious aim of the human sciences (getting another person's mental life right) or to collapse interpretivism into a non-distinct kind of scientific antirealism. To deny that Verstehen traffics in explanation fails to respect the diversity of explanations in the natural sciences or requires unpacking the rather mercurial concept of objectual understanding. In principle, these challenges are surmountable, but they are far from trivial, either.
Can Verstehen Bypass the Explanatory Nexus?
If Verstehen and scientific understanding are both committed to MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING, then, in the present context, interpretivists will have to argue that Verstehen does not improve in accordance with the EKS Model's two remaining features. Recall that the EKS Model's first norm for improving understanding is THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE:
Understanding of why p improves in proportion to the amount explanatory information about p that is grasped.
We can see the amount of explanatory information as a function of three things:
• The number of correct explanations and inter-explanatory relations grasped
• The quality/importance of the explanations and inter-explanatory relations grasped
• The level of detail of the explanations and inter-explanatory relations grasped (Khalifa 2017, 10) Thus, interpretivists should find examples in which social scientists are confronted with two or more accounts of the same phenomenon, and opt for one that is strictly dominated along these three dimensions. Ideally, the social scientists would provide compelling methodological reasons for their choice.
Having laid out the burden of proof, I must profess ignorance as to whether social-scientific practice will favor interpretivists or naturalists. However, let me offer two motivations for tethering Verstehen to THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE. First, THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE easily piggybacks on the preceding arguments for MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING. The basic idea is this: because MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING entails that one gets some understanding by getting a little bit of explanatory information, it's natural to think that one gets more understanding with more explanatory information-but this is precisely what THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE counsels.
Insofar as there may be room for claiming that Verstehen does not improve in proportion to explanatory information, it is that certain kinds of explanatory information do not seem to enhance Verstehen. For instance, suppose that Rosaldo's ethnographic work could be integrated with findings in cognitive neuroscience. One might argue that this enhances our scientific understanding, but not our Verstehen, of Ilongot headhunting. However, it is hard to see how this line of argument will pass the Distinction Test. For instance, just as our hypothetical anthropologists can safely ignore neuroscientific factors that affect Ilongot headhunting, physicists working in classical regimes can often safely ignore quantum-mechanical and relativistic explanatory factors. To put this another way, this just seems to conflate the fact that inquirers of all persuasions sometimes favor the quality or relevance of explanatory information over its sheer quantity. Understanding of why p improves in proportion to the resemblance of this grasp to scientific knowledge of why p.
Furthermore, scientific knowledge of an explanation was characterized as a safe belief in an explanation that is because of SEEing. We can see resemblance to this knowledge as having several dimensions:
• The number of plausible potential explanations that the agent has considered
• The number of considered explanations that the agent has compared using scientifically acceptable methods and evidence
• The scientific status of the methods and evidence that the agent used to compare the explanations
• The safety of the agent's beliefs about explanations
• The accuracy of the agent's beliefs about explanations
• The variety of ways that the agent can use explanatory information so as to achieve different scientific goals (Khalifa 2017, 13-14) As with THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE, if interpretivists wish to challenge THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE as a norm governing Verstehen, they should find examples in which social scientists are confronted with two or more accounts of the same phenomenon, and opt for one that is strictly dominated along these six dimensions.
Ideally, the social scientists would provide compelling methodological reasons for their choice.
Having presented this burden of proof, I must once again profess ignorance as to whether social-scientific practice will favor interpretivists or naturalists. Consider those who hold that understanding largely consists of fitting a phenomenon into a coherent system of beliefs (Elgin 2017 , Carter and Gordon 2014 , Riggs 2009 , Kvanvig 2003 . It is unsurprising that this kind of understanding is common to the natural and social sciences. With rare exception, scientists aim to fit their explanation with their other theoretical and empirical commitments.
Unsurprisingly, then, few coherence-based constraints on understanding are even pitched as dividing lines between natural-and social-scientific understanding.
Indeed, Elgin (2017) provides the most developed coherentist-based account and highlights several commonalities between scientific, humanistic, and artistic understanding.
More directly, the EKS Model also countenances typical coherence-making relationships, e.g. logical, probabilistic, and explanatory relationships between propositions. However, these relationships only provide understanding insofar as they figure in SEEing. No other coherence-based constraints on understanding require this, and instead are fairly underspecified about the cognitive processes that yielded these coherence-making relationships. Hence, the EKS Model is more demanding than these coherentist approaches. 12
Turn now to ability-based constraints, which claim that understanding is only achieved when certain abilities are exercised. They are more varied than coherentist approaches, and so require more extensive discussion. The EKS Model's trademark abilities are those characterizing SEEing: consideration, comparison, and the inferences required to go from explanatory comparisons to explanatory commitments. Additionally, one must have the requisite abilities to wield the EXPLAINS concept, i.e. one must be able to explain.
Thus, views which only require understanders to be able to explain (Greco 2013 , Pritchard 2014 will be less demanding than the EKS Model, since they will not have any rider about SEEing. Some views attempt to specify this explanatory ability in greater detail, typically by adding that understanders must be able to engage in counterfactual reasoning of some sort (Hills 2015 , Grimm 2014 .
However, this is also required by the EKS Model, for counterfactual reasoning appears to be essential for showing how an explanans makes a difference to its explanandum. Since these views also place no constraints on how that explanation is acquired, while the EKS Model specifies SEEing as the preferred pathway to explanatory knowledge, it is also more demanding than these views. 13 Wilkenfeld's (2013) view requires understanders to be able to manipulate representations in a manner that enables them to perform a context-relevant task. However, the preceding is more in the spirit of an invitation to carry on a new conversation than it is a shot across the interpretivist bow. I welcome 15 For further comparison between my view and Newman's, see Khalifa (2015) .
interpretivists to discharge some of the burdens of proof I have presented.
Additionally, I have been silent as to whether the EKS Model imposes sufficient conditions on Verstehen. I conclude by briefly pointing to two issues on this front that deserve further discussion going forward.
First, the EKS Model is highly attuned to the differences between sciences.
Different explanations will have different local constraints. Different explanatory evaluations will require different methods and different kinds of evidence. All of these differences occur between different natural sciences just as much as they occur between the natural sciences and the human sciences. So, for interpretivists seeking to establish that Verstehen requires more than scientific understanding, a key question will be whether this "something extra" isn't just a variation on one of these themes.
Second, no two scientific fields are identical, so there will always be differences. Presumably, interpretivists intend for the differences between
Verstehen and scientific understanding to be deeper than the differences between, say, understanding in physics and chemistry. But then when do these differences become "deep enough" for interpretivists to declare victory in the Verstehen Wars? 16 I suspect that this might be the key to settling the Verstehen Wars once and for all.
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